A Chinese patrol vessel in South China Sea, March 9, 2014. (ChinaFotoPress/Getty Images)
As tensions increase between China and Vietnam around their territorial dispute in the South China Sea, pressure is increasing on Vietnam’s government from back home as popular anger builds up against the country’s powerful neighbor. Hundreds of people took part in demonstrations across Vietnam over the weekend, expressing outrage over China’s provocative decision to operate an oil rig near the Paracel Islands, an area both countries lay claim to. The longstanding dispute came to a head last week after Vietnam claimed that China deliberately rammed a vessel into two of its ships.
Since then, Vietnam has witnessed rare displays of public political protest against the Chinese government — a movement that seems to be at least partly sanctioned by the country’s communist authorities. According to some participants, the rally in front of the Chinese embassy in Hanoi on Sunday was the “largest anti-Chinese demonstration” the city has witnessed in recent memory. Anti-Chinese sentiment has flared in Vietnam periodically over the past several decades — also mainly centered on naval skirmishes between the two states. The current crisis may not have escalated to the level of 1979’s bloody border war but it has nonetheless marked a notable departure from the cautious diplomatic approach the two states have typically employed in recent years.

Source: AFP
China is maintaining the upper hand in this bilateral squabble, especially following the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Myanmar this past weekend, which failed to produce a statement condemning Chinese provocations in the South China Sea. While several countries have similar territorial disputes with Beijing in the area, the lack of willingness to collectively commit to broader regional condemnation deals a blow to Hanoi’s international campaign against Beijing (not to mention Manila’s very similar efforts).
Hence, the benefits of a vocal domestic outcry, justifying the urgency of Hanoi’s diplomatic position on the issue. However, despite the Vietnamese government’s tacit approval of these demonstrations, it is also clear that the country’s communist authorities have an uneasy relationship with public political expression that puts such a movement in a tenuous position. Especially given the overlap between anti-China factions and anti-government groups in Vietnam. Vietnamese authorities will thus keep a wary eye on these protests for fear they will become less diplomatic help than domestic hindrance.
Meanwhile, Hanoi will have to carefully weigh its diplomatic approach with Beijing, with which it continues to maintain over $50 billion worth of bilateral trade. As an important regional ally, Vietnam can’t afford to act rashly here (something that should be noted amid talk of Hanoi following Manila’s footsteps and pursuing international arbitration in The Hague). While authorities will continue to echo public expressions of anger towards Beijing, look for the issue to reach a convenient stalemate as Hanoi is sure to privately temper its rhetoric with Beijing.











