Recep Tayyip Erdogan at a meeting in Ankara, on June 14, 2013. (ADEM ALTAN/AFP/Getty Images)
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is not known for his delicacy. But his most recent political outburst, in which he refused to recognize Egypt’s interim rulers, is sure to have consequences for his government’s relations with Cairo.
Ties between the two countries have been strained in recent weeks following the military coup that resulted in the removal from power of Mohammed Morsi, a major ally of Erdogan’s. The Turkish leader’s defense of his ousted Islamist counterpart has had Cairo’s new leadership boiling but his decision to ignore an entreaty from newly-installed interim Vice President Mohammed El-Baradei could heighten tensions to a critical level. Erdogan’s rejection of El-Baradei’s request for a conversation on Wednesday was leveled with characteristic combativeness: “How could I speak to you? You were not elected, you were appointed by the orchestrators of a coup.”
Egypt’s recent developments will have hit uncomfortably close to home for the leader, making his firm objections entirely understandable. Turkey’s own history of military coups against elected governments is no doubt looming in the background for Erdogan who, like Morsi, is leading an Islamist party under almost unprecedented pressure at home.
Beyond the disconcerting parallels between the two situations, however, is the (now indeterminate) promise of Turkey’s foreign policy in the region. Turkey had leapfrogged off of the Arab Spring to develop its influence throughout the Arab world and the rise of Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt was a boon for Erdogan’s AKP government. The shift in the region’s balance of power, which favored Turkey at the expense of Gulf monarchies (with Qatar constituting a notable exception), is now being recalibrated in the aftermath of Morsi’s fall — much to Erdogan’s chagrin.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates gleefully welcomed the fall of Morsi, pledging billions to Egypt’s new government and reestablishing their privileged status with the country. Turkey, on the other hand, has been met with scorn by Egypt’s government, which has been voicing its “strong resentment” at Erdogan’s continued support for Morsi — or, as Erdogan unbudgingly refers to him, “my president in Egypt.”
The current climate of increased hostility towards foreign powers in Egypt will make it very difficult for Erdogan to recover his standing in the country — and all the more so should he choose to continue antagonizing the country’s new leadership. While Erdogan’s principled stance is the logical response from him, it will inevitably damage Turkey’s ties to Egypt, especially given the political echo chamber that has dominated Egypt since Morsi’s fall, with government and media largely unified in their messaging. Alienating the Arab world’s largest country would constitute a massive failure for Erdogan’s regional foreign policy — and zero out one of the major accomplishments the embattled leader could legitimately bank on back home.
