Egyptian satirist and television host Bassem Youssef (C) is surrounded by his supporters upon arrival at the public prosecutor’s office in the high court in Cairo, on March 31, 2013. (KHALED DESOUKI/AFP/Getty Images)
“There is a devil inside that is maliciously messing with people’s minds,” was Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi’s recent ominous take on the cause of his country’s mounting political instability. With Sunday’s arrest of Bassem Youssef, Egypt’s most celebrated television comedian, on charges of of “disrupting public order,” insulting the president, and denigrating Islam, Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood government appears to have snared a very high-profile “devil” indeed.
Just one problem: this latest piece of Morsi’s crackdown against media detractors has given his opponents a serious window of opportunity. The government has already proven its tendency to underestimate the response to its crackdown on activists — as in the case of well-known blogger Alaa Abdel Fattah’s arrest last week.
Like Abdel-Fattah, Youssef has so far been remarkably adept at using his arrest to publicly undermine Morsi and his government’s media crackdown. From the moment that the public prosecutor ordered Youssef’s arrest, Youssef was already tweeting jokes about the situation. Arriving to answer his arrest warrant, Youssef was met by a crowd of vocal supporters and even used the moment as an opportunity to further mock the president by posing in front of the courthouse in a giant hat modeled after the one Morsi wore to a degree ceremony in Pakistan last month. But with an average of 30 million viewers in the region tuning into his weekly comedic program Al Bernameg, it’s clear however that Youssef’s popularity is no laughing matter to the Muslim Brotherhood. Youssef’s arrest was followed by the news that CBC, the network that airs Al Bernameg was now being warned that its license could be revoked for airing “offensive” content on the show. Additionally, state security prosecutors are now reported to be investigating staff at ONTV, another popular media outlet typically critical of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Brotherhood’s strategy of neutralizing institutional roadblocks — such as independent media and the judiciary — has enjoyed some success. The backlash against these moves has been vocal but has not ultimately forced any concessions or compromises from the government. And yes, the arrest of a well-known media personality is obviously a more juicy news story than overreach in the judiciary. But the widespread negative attention garnered by the case is not why this will count as a serious tactical misstep for Morsi’s government. Remember that the reaction to the Youssef affair is partly fueled by outrage over the government’s handling of the daunting challenges facing the country, including a looming fuel and food crisis that threatens to escalate the current dismal economic situation into a full-on crisis. The perception that Morsi’s government is, in the middle of all of this, expending resources to prosecute comedians (while coming up short on necessary sexual assault investigations) is not likely to make the Brotherhood’s popularity do anything but plummet.
Which explains the charge of “denigrating Islam” leveled against Youssef. The government counted on the extreme sensitivity around perceived slights against Islam in Egypt to redound to their benefit. In other words, this is a sociopolitical appeal, one aimed at directing attention away from the economy and presenting the Brotherhood’s other justificatory prop: that it as an institution is needed as the caretaker of Islam in public life. (It should also be noted that the religious argument against Youssef also offers a convenient way to backtrack against accusations that Morsi’s government is modeling itself after its deposed predecessor’s: had they gone with insulting the president alone, they risked calling up memories of Mubarak, who favored such charges.)
But that justification is weakening. In a Monday interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour, Youssef turned the religious argument around: “I am Muslim. I’m a practicing Muslim. I always say I’m a proud Egyptian, a proud Muslim… people who claim to be the sole (representatives) of Islam; they are actually giving a bad image, and they’re basically insulting the image of Islam.” Youssef’s statements, widely replayed in the Egyptian media, represent an effort to reclaim the religious high ground that the Muslim Brotherhood has effectively used to target their detractors. The least defensible — but perhaps most powerful- charge the Brotherhood used against Youssef? It’s now owned by the man it was directed against. Hard to imagine a more powerful tool: its high-visibility, its a frontal assault on the Brotherhood’s brand, and it provides a model for the like-minded to try and wrest back rhetorical possession (so to speak) of religion in the public sphere. It’s fair to say that the Brotherhood is losing (or has already lost) the economic argument. Losing this one would be fatal.
