U.S. President Barack Obama (R) takes a question from a member of the press as Jordan’s King Abdullah. REUTERS/Mike Theiler
Though the killing of an American diplomat at the U.S. mission in Benghazi last year has reentered the headlines, dominating the debate in Washington, the more immediate question of what do about another Middle Eastern quagmire, Syria, continues to plague the White House.
Free Syrian Army (FSA) troops, frustrated with the slow pace of their gains on the Assad regime and the unwillingness of much of the Western world to provide robust military aid, are increasingly ditching their traditional military units for better armed al-Qaeda affiliated militants like Jabhat al-Nusra. Which means that the desire of American policymakers to prevent arms from falling into the hands of extremist groups is essentially backfiring; indeed, it seems that more and more previously mainstream soldiers are jumping at the opportunity to join what is considered the most elite fighting force in the country, albeit one designated a terrorist organization by the United States and some allies. And it should come as no surprise if the American president’s foreign policy and national security standing — considered a strong suit last fall during his re-election campaign in the face of a weak economy (and the successful killing of many terrorist leaders with drones, as well as the assassination of Osama bin Laden) — takes a dip with the revelations that White House aides repeatedly tweaked how the Libyan attackers were described with public opinion in mind. More importantly, Obama’s ability to make foreign policy without congressional harassment is now in some doubt.
Fortunately for the president, the modern system of American government leaves essentially all national security powers to the executive branch. Indeed, the no-fly zone established over Libya that helped oust the Gadhafi regime did not require congressional approval, and the War Powers Act of 1973 is usually interpreted as granting the president power to deploy ground troops for brief periods of time, granting him broad flexibility in Syria. But we know from his past decisions and general disposition that such a deployment is unlikely. Instead, the question of a no-fly zone remains paramount, and the news that Russia is backing off plans to sell new, state-of-the-art anti-war defenses to the crumbling Assad regime — along with what is arguably a misunderstanding of Israel’s ease in carrying out airstrikes on Syria — makes such a solution more likely than ever.
Indeed, support from Britain and France and much of the rest of NATO would likely be there, though much tougher to divine is how the new political pain stemming from the Benghazi fallout might creep into foreign policy decision making. In the face of GOP senators like John McCain and Lindsay Graham calling for intervention, will the so far fairly stubborn administration (when it comes to refusing to arm the rebels) lose its cool and change gears? Or does the healthy margin of the president’s re-election leave the White House comfortable digging in and braving the storm? Either way, the administration’s rhetorical dance on “red lines,” chemical weapons, and civilians is getting tougher by the day. And more and more Syrians are turning to extremist outlets in the meantime, muddying the waters still further.
