Despite calls from both U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and French President François Hollande, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has firmly stated that Moscow would not be seeking to persuade Bashar al-Assad to step down as Syrian leader. Speaking in Moscow, he affirmed that “We’re not in the regime-change game. We are against interference in domestic conflicts.”
While Russia remains one of the main obstacles to more robust international pressure against the Syrian regime, it is also one of the few countries potentially able to exert influence over Assad.
On the surface, its role has appeared fundamentally intransigent. Russia’s position is essentially pragmatic, though: it is suspicious of Western motives and believes that Assad’s fall would simply lead to anarchy and a rise in Islamist militancy in the region.
Beyond blocking efforts by the international community to address the Syrian crisis in the United Nations, Russia is also providing practical assistance. Although the West has had some successes in stemming the flow of weapons and ammunition to the Syrians, Russia’s position is that it is still willing to arm Assad. Anatoly Isaikin, director of Russian arms export agency Rosoboronexport, has affirmed that existing contracts will be honored. More generally, Russian advisers continue to occupy key positions within the military and intelligence community and Russian business is an eager economic partner. Russian firms Stroitransgaz is a major player in Syria’s energy industry, for example.
However, there are also limited signs of movement in Russia’s position. A small naval taskforce it has dispatched to the Mediterranean is clearly intended to evacuate Russian nationals in case the situation changes. Furthermore, while Russia has supplied essentially defensive weapons such as Pantsir S-1 and BUK-M2 air defense systems, it maintains its freeze on selling Syria offensive ones, such as the 36 Yak-130 jets it ordered in 2012.
Meanwhile, Russia’s efforts to help broker peace talks, which for a long time were really just attempts to split or undermine the opposition, are beginning to look more serious. Moscow still feels that there is a chance that Assad can win his civil war. So long as this is a viable possibility, they will back him. However, the signs are that the Kremlin is increasingly pessimistic and is therefore seriously looking at a post-Assad Plan B. This may involve offering Assad and his family an escape route, but also looking for new allies. Russia’s overt refusal to meddle in Syrian politics is thus a temporary stance, and may mask quiet overtures to Turkey and the opposition.
